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ABSTRACT
This paper suggests a new agenda for constructing early warning models (EWMs) to
enhance their effectiveness in predicting financial crises. The central argument of the
new agenda aims to eradicate the weaknesses of existing EWMs, since their failure to
predict the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 demonstrates the need to improve their
efficiency. We document the history of EWMs and propose a new agenda as follows:
1) the accurate measurement of a financial crisis, 2) implementation of a fourthgeneration crisis model to capture the dynamic nature of the financial crisis, and 3) the
inclusion of interconnectedness/contagion variables as explanatory variables for the
financial crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting financial crises1 has become the central motive and a huge challenging
task for policymakers in the face of the enormous costs associated with frequent
financial crises. The nature of financial crises generates great costs in terms of
economic slowdown, output losses, widespread bankruptcies, unemployment,
financial instability, a vicious circle of low credit and insolvency, and so on
(e.g.Krugman, 1999; IMF, 2002; Hutchison and Noy, 2006; Claessens et al., 2012;
Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Claessens and Kose, 2013; Pritsker, 2013). These forms
of economic consequences further lead to loss of confidence among investors,
which is a major cause of low investment and capital outflows. The consequences
become even more dire with the joint occurrence of different crises. The latest
example of a triple crisis2 is the global financial crisis in 2007–2008 (GFC), which
provided light during the darkest phase of the economic downturn throughout
the world. The consequences of financial crises are not limited to output loss and
employment loss, but also include socio political-psychological imbalances that
can destroy economic and social stability (Hutchison and Noy, 2006). Due to these
multidimensional consequences, predicting the leading factors of a financial crisis
is a major challenge for policymakers, and the difficulties are amplified by the
dynamic nature of the financial crisis.
Financial crises are costly in terms of depth and duration.3 Table 1 shows that,
in terms of duration and cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) loss, the GFC,
as a percentage, was more costly than all the financial events from 1880 to 2007.
Apart from GDP loss, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) emphasize the problems with
creditworthiness and bankruptcy spillover during a financial crisis. Claessens
and Kose (2013) explain that the low ability to service debt can act as the seed for
future crises, due to the collapse in output caused by the loss in creditworthiness.
Similarly, Kaminsky et al. (1998) consider decreased credit ratings, loss of reserves,
and increases in the cost of borrowing as crucial consequences of a financial crisis.
Further, financial crises lead to sharp drops in real wages and employment and the
deterioration of social and economic infrastructure (Gupta et al., 2003).

1

2

3

Financial crises can be regarded as efficiency losses in the financial market and imbalances in the
financial sector. These can take the form of sudden and stronger changes in the pricing and quantities
of financial instruments, such as foreign exchanges, stocks, bills of exchange (Claessens and Kose,
2013).
A triple crisis in year t can be defined as a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis
during the period [t - 1, t + 1] and a sovereign debt crisis during the period [t - 1, t + 1].
Crisis depth is defined as the peak-to-trough percentage decline in the GDP. Similarly, crisis depth
is proxied by the cumulative loss in GDP over the length of the crisis, as a fraction of the pre-crisis
level, whereas duration is defined as the number of years an economy’s output takes to recover to
pre-crisis levels.
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Table 1.
Duration and Depth of Financial Crisis
This table provides a broad comparison of crises based on duration and depth, collected from Bordo et al. (2001) and
Cecchetti et al. (2009). The average duration of crisis in an year is around 2.4, and the depth ranges from 5.2% to 20%
during the costliest crises that occurred in the world from 1880-2008.

Avg. Duration of Crisis in
Years

Avg. Crisis Depth (In terms
of cumulative GDP loss
relative to peak in percent)

1880-1913 (Barings crisis of 1890,
New York Panic of 1907)

2.4

9.8

1919-1939 (Great Depression)

2.4

13.4

1945-1971

1.8

5.2

2.5-2.6

7.8-8.3

2.5

20

Period/Events

1973-1997 (Latin American crisis
of the 1980sthe , ERM crisis of
1992 , the Asian and Russian
crisis of 1997-98)
2007-08 (Global financial crisis
of 2008)

In the mean time, two forms of globalization, trade and financial integration,
have created fear among investors since the GFC due to the possibility of
contagion.4 Given an integrated economy, the balance sheet channel assisted by
the so-called wake-up call hypothesis5 (Goldstein, 1998) and the “unholy trinity
of financial contagion” (Kaminsky et al., 2003) exacerbate the international
transmission of shocks. Following an adverse shock in one economy, financial
intermediaries operating in other economies are forced to correct their balance
sheet by adjusting their equity-to-debt ratio. In this context, due to the transmission
of shocks, credit availability in both economies declines, and integrated economies
will face similar financial turbulence. The stronger the balance sheet channel, the
stronger the transmission will be (Davis, 2014). Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2000) highlight the importance of the international bank lending channel as an
international transmission mechanism. Further, Imbs (2010) identifies financial
linkages among economies as directly responsible for the transmission of the
GFC and the reason a housing bubble and subprime crisis in the United States
became “the first global recession in decades.”6 This transmission of financial crisis
has highlighted the role of financial contagion in driving the consequences, and
it seems to be effective in identifying future events, even if a country does not
have a direct linkage with the crisis-affected country. Even if the argument against
4

5

6

The word contagion means the spread of market disturbances observed through comovements in
exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows.
This hypothesis offers an explanation for contagion, wherein a financial crisis in one region is a
wake-up call for investors in another region who assess their investment based on fundamentals. See
Goldstein (1998) for more details.
The GFC originated in the United States, but became a global shock, whose consequences affected
most economies. This event led the world economy into a recession and can be compared to the
Great Depression of 1929. For more details, see Imbs (2010).
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contagion had existed before 2008 in the consideration of contagious variables in
policy action (Berg et al., 2004; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010), the major transition
in the world economy caused by the GFC reignited the fear of financial contagion,
motivating the search for instruments to recognize the signs.
To identify the leading indicators of a financial crisis, governments, banks, and
international financial institutions have especially emphasized the construction of
early warning models (EWMs)7 to fend against the crisis prior to its occurrence or
to dampen the consequences if not completely avoided. However, these models
were unable to predict the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009,
2012; Christofides et al., 2016). In this context, the following questions arise: 1)
Are current EWMs capable of predicting future financial events? 2) Will there be
an ironic repetition of “this time is different”?8 3) Can crisis generation models
capture the dynamic behavior of a financial crisis? 4) Do existing EWMs require
augmentation?
The successful prediction of a financial crisis depends solely on the ability of
EWMs to identify the leading indicators of financial turbulence. EWMs are needed
to predict vulnerability events and are helpful in accurately framing warnings to
predict whether an event will turn into a crisis or to minimize the consequences if
an event cannot be completely avoided (IMF, 2010). The careful implementation
of EWMs can be helpful in policy formulation in maintaining the stability of an
economy. The development of an accurate and reliable EWM is a challenging task
for policymakers to obtain an accurate signal to avoid the occurrence of financial
turbulence or to mitigate the consequences. Greater EWM accuracy will result in
lower costs associated with financial crisis, and vice versa. The failure of EWMs
in predicting financial crises not only will have costly consequences, but will
also raise questions about the efficiency of the EWMs themselves within their
operating framework. However, the irony of this time being different has created
more difficulty in the construction of EWMs for policymakers. Nonetheless,
existing EWMs must be augmented to accurately predict financial crises. In this
scenario, we propose a future agenda for constructing EWMs that could enhance
their efficiency.
Our study is motivated by the incidence of the GFC, an event that the existing
EWMs failed to forecast. First, the consequences of the failure of EWMs in
predicting financial crises is more costly if the EWM fails to predict a crisis than
if a crisis is predicted but does not occur (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006). If the
event was predicted, then the economy will be aware of the future occurrence
of the event and preventive measures are implemented prior to its occurrence.
Conversely, if a crisis is not predicted, then the unnoticed occurrence of financial
turbulence will have lead to the EWMs’ complete failure. In this case, the efficiency
of EWMs is in doubt, since whether these models are really capable of predicting
financial crises is in question (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2011).

7

8

The IMF (2002) explains early warning systems as an approach to the identification of vulnerabilities/
causative factors of financial crisis in the economy and useful in predicting future financial events.
Every financial crisis is different by nature and difficult to identify by following past patterns of financial crisis.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) explain this concept in more detail.
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Second, theoretical crisis generation models also lose their predictive powers
in identifying explanatory variables that effectively driven financial crises in the
past. This demonstrates the existence of new variables that are not included among
existing explanatory variables for financial crises. Further, a fourth-generation
crisis model is needed to include stem variables in the EWMs, to enhance their
efficiency (Candelon et al., 2014). Finally, the dynamic nature of financial crises
in today’s globalized world has highlighted the need to augment current EWMs
so that they will be able to not only capture the dynamic nature of financial
turbulence, but also enhance their efficiency in predicting events. In this context,
this paper tries to answer the following questions: 1) How can the effectiveness of
EWMs be enhanced? 2) How can a new agenda for the construction of EWMs be
framed?
Our approach in this study is as follows. First, we document the history of
EWMs and their theoretical background. Second, we focus on the need for a new
agenda in relation to the failure of the EWMs, the dynamic nature of financial
crises, and the irony of this time being different. Finally, we propose a new agenda
consisting of the need for hybrid measures of financial crisis, for a fourth-generation
crisis model to capture stem variables, and for the inclusion of interconnectedness
variables in the EWMs.
In the line with this approach, we followed several steps: (1) We identify the
literature related to EWMs. This search resulted in 62 papers in journals (IMF
Economic Review, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Monetary
Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Review of International Economics, International
Journal of Finance and Economics, Journal of Financial Stability, Journal of Applied
Economics, Journal of Applied Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics and Banking,
European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Surveys, Open Economic Review,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, and American Economic Review), 19 working papers
from international institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the National
Bureau of Economic Research, the Bank for International Settlements, and the
European Central Bank), seven chapters and discussion papers from banks and
other financial institutions (the Czech National Bank and the National Bureau of
Economic Research), four occasional and discussion papers (the Bank of Finland
and the Reserve Bank of India), nine books from different publishers (MIT Press,
University of Chicago Press, Princeton University Press, and the Institute for
International Economics), one conference paper, and one PhD dissertation. This
filter technique can be attributed to the steps of EWMs; the occurrence of the GFC,
which weakened the predictive power of EWMs; and theoretical arguments for
improving the efficiency of EWMs. (2) We focus on the reasons for the failure of
EWMs in line with the GFC, the most costly financial event that ever occurred.
(3) Finally, we propose a future agenda for the construction of EWMs to overcome
the lacuna associated with existing EWMs.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, this study could
be the first attempt to document the history of EWMs with their theoretical
background. Second, it is the first to propose a future agenda for the construction
of EWMs based on the inclusion of all three stages. Third, the proposed agenda
complements the ideas of the dynamic nature (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009a), joint occurrence (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and financial
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contagion (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010; Imbs, 2010) associated with financial
crises. Finally, this study is in line with that of Claessens and Kose (2013) and
Peltonen et al. (2015), who emphasize the nature of spillover/contagion as being
appropriate in designing crisis mitigation and response policy and potentially
enhancing the efficiency of EWMs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief
overview of EWMs and their historical evolution. Section III demonstrates the
need for a new agenda for the construction of EWMs for financial crises. Section IV
presents the proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF EWMS
Kindleberger (1978) introduces the EWM and attempts to determine its importance.
Salant and Henderson (1978) then develop a model that can predict a financial
crisis when speculator self-interest is leading to a market-based dismantling
of unsustainable policies. The purpose of EWMs is to detect the vulnerabilities
responsible for financial crises to allow for the implementation of preventive
policies (IMF, 2010).
The construction of an EWM involves three procedures. First, the primary step
in formulating a model is to define financial crisis. Second, the explanatory variables
are selected, that is, those variables that are very likely to lead a financial crisis
if they cross a threshold. Finally, various econometric/statistical methodologies
provide the models a finishing touch. Given all these stages, an EWM is thereby
set to identify the leading indicators of a financial event.
EWMs face several challenges during their construction. First, defining a
financial crisis is always difficult, because of the different forms of crisis in different
countries over different periods (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Abiad, 2003). Second, the
explanatory variables for the financial crisis must be identified, along with the
underlying economic reasoning (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld; 1986; Radelet and
Sachs, 1998). Third, the appropriate choice of statistical/econometric methodology
must be made or because that can alter the results.
A. Definitions of the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis can be classified into two broad categories, quantitative and
qualitative. The quantitative category includes currency crises and sudden stops,
where the crisis can be measured quantitatively. The qualitative category includes
banking and debt crises, where the crisis can be measured using a judgmental
definition (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). The literature on EWMs has suggested
several definitions of financial crises, including currency crises (Frankel and Rose,
1996; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Berg and Pattillo, 1999a, 1999b; Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999), sudden stops (Calvo, 1998; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000),
banking crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2012), and sovereign debt crises (Manasse
and Roubini, 2009; Dawood et al., 2017). Sometimes crises are correlated with
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each other and emerge as a twin crisis9 (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) or triple
crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b), which becomes difficult to define in a simple
manner.
A1. Currency Crisis
A currency crisis is defined as a speculative attack on the foreign exchange value
of a currency that either results in a sharp depreciation or forces the authorities to
defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves or raising the domestic
interest rate (Claessens and Kose, 2013). Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency
crisis as a normal depreciation of 25% or more that is at least 10% greater than
the depreciation in the preceding year. Similarly, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
(1998) define a currency crisis as involving, in addition to a depreciation of 25%
or more, at least a doubling of the rate of depreciation the previous year and a
rate of depreciation below 40% that of the previous year, to avoid capturing the
large exchange rate fluctuations associated with periods of high inflation. In this
context, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use an index of exchange rate pressure10
to measure currency crises. Examples of currency crises include the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971–1973, the crisis of the British pound in 1976,
the breakdown of the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992–1993, the Latin
American tequila crisis following Mexico’s peso devaluation in 1994–1995, the
East Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, and the GFC.
A2. Sudden Stops
A financial crisis characterized by sudden stops is due to disruptions in the
supply of external financing. This concept of sudden stops was first proposed
by Calvo (1998) and is defined as a large and unexpected halt in the financing
of the current account deficit, triggered by an systemic external event, such as
a generalized increase in sovereign spreads throughout emerging markets. The
author’s argument is that economies experiencing large current account deficits
are potentially exposed to large and unexpected stops in the financing of the
current account, or sudden stops. Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
identify the sudden reversal of capital flows as a potential cause of a liquidity
crisis. Sudden stops can be captured by a spike in emerging market bond index
spreads. Examples of sudden stops can be traced back to crisis events such as the
Mexican crisis of 1994 (the tequila effect), the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–
1998, and the Russian crisis of 1998, where capital inflows ended with sudden
stops and also resulted in capital outflow.

9

10

A twin crisis in year t is a banking crisis in year t combined with a currency crisis during the period [t - 1, t +
1]. For more details, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
The index of exchange rate market pressure is a weighted average of exchange rate changes and
reserve changes. A financial crisis can be identified as when the index exceeds a country-specific
threshold level. The index takes into account exchange rate depreciation and reserve losses, with
equal weighting to influence the index. See Eichengreen et al. (1995) for an overview.
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A3. Banking Crisis
In a systemic banking crisis, actual or potential bank runs11 and failures can induce
banks to suspend the convertibility of their liabilities or compel the government
to intervene to prevent this by extending liquidity and capital assistance on a
large scale (Claessens and Kose, 2013). As a bank run starts, it generates its own
momentum, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy: as more people withdraw their
deposits, the likelihood of default increases, which encourages further withdrawals.
This can destabilize a bank and lead to its bankruptcy if it cannot liquidate assets
quickly enough to cover its short-term liabilities, because a bank’s investment
or loan consists of long-term deposits, whereas liabilities consist of short-term
deposits. When a bank run becomes complementary to bank run psychology,12
it makes the situation more difficult for the banking sector. In a nonfundamental
way, bank runs could arise because of the expectations of individual depositors
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). On the other hand, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) date
the beginning of banking crises by two types of events: first, bank runs that lead
to the bank’s closure and, second, the merger or takeover by the public sector of
one or more financial institutions. The Ecuador banking crisis of 1998, the Russian
crisis of 1998, and the UK rescue package of 2015 are a few examples of banking
crises.
A4. Sovereign Debt Crisis
The inability or unwillingness to pay, that is, default, is the primary source of a
debt crisis, which increases the probability of losing all the money that has been
given to or invested in a country. In the absence of gunboat diplomacy,13 lenders
cannot seize collateral from another country, or at least from a sovereign, if it
refuses to pay its debt obligations. In the absence of an enforcement mechanism—
that is, the analog of domestic bankruptcy, economic reasons, and the absence of
legal arguments and so on—a debt crisis is a matter of great concern (Claessens
and Kose, 2013). However, Kletzer and Wright (2000) argue that a country defaults
when the opportunity cost of not being able to borrow again is low and the terms
of trade are good and are expected to remain so. Countries default in bad times
to smooth consumption, but few countries are able to escape default on domestic
debt, with often adverse economic consequences. An empirical study on debt
intolerance and serial default by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) suggests that safe
debt thresholds hinge on country-specific factors, such as a country’s record of
default and inflation; when the external debt level of an emerging country is above

11

12

13

Bank runs arise because of panic, rather than a bank’s absolute insolvency. A run occurs when a large number
of customers withdraw their deposits because they believe the bank is or could become insolvent (Simorangkir,
2006, 2011; Anwar and Ali, 2018).
The bank run psychology is associated with bank runs, where the depositors are not willing to be
the last person to withdraw money from the bank if they perceive vulnerability in the banking sector
and the bank can default any time. This is more of a psychological than an economic phenomenon.
equal weighting to influence the index. See Eichengreen et al. (1995) for an overview.
Forcing a debtor to pay back a loan using threats about the consequences of or creating the
circumstances for war is a bureaucratic political decision.
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30–35% of the gross national product, the likelihood of an external debt crisis rises
substantially. Examples of sovereign debt crises are the Brazilian crisis of 1991,
Argentina’s default of 2001, and Greece in 2015.
Currency crises have a close association with financial crises and are often
associated with banking crises. The joint occurrence of a currency and a banking
crisis together is called a twin crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and if the
twin crisis occurs together with a sovereign debt crisis, it becomes a triple crisis.
Examples of twin crises include the crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Korea from 1997 to 1998, and the GFC comprised a triple event.
In the presence of multiple types of financial crisis, we use the broader term
financial crisis in this paper because our objective is to frame an agenda for EWMs,
with a focus on improving their effectiveness. The use of any different term will
limit the concept of EWMs to a specific type of crisis. The use of the term financial
crisis is in line with the occurrence of multiple financial events and the interlinkages
among various financial events.
B. Potential Candidates for Explaining Financial Crisis: The Search for Regressors
The identification of explanatory variables for financial crises is the second step
of EWM construction. The factors that determine a financial crisis can be derived
theoretically, empirically, or both. Theoretical models suggest three generations
of financial crisis models for the fundamental explanation of crises, while the
empirical literature provides various variables related to financial crises.
B1. First-generation Crisis Model
The first theoretical model associated with financial crisis, popularly known as
the first-generation crisis model, is that of Krugman (1979). The author explains
that the government’s inconsistent policies, such as financing the budget deficit
by printing excessive money under a fixed exchange rate system, will gradually
lead to low levels of international reserve holdings and a currency crisis. Overall,
this model identifies weak fundamentals, such as budget and trade deficits, and
uses the appreciation of the real exchange rate as the primary indicator of firstgeneration speculative attacks. Flood and Garber (1984) augment Krugman’s
model by generating a distribution of the size and timing of the speculative
attack, broadly known as the KFG model in the crisis literature. The first empirical
study using the KFG model is that of Blanco and Garber (1986), who analyze the
currency devaluations in Mexico in 1976 and 1981–1982. The authors find that a
speculative attack induces the policy authority to implement a preemptive and
state-dependent currency devaluation to help mitigate reserve losses. Similarly,
a higher trade deficit signals a crisis, since it leads to currency depreciation and
renders the current account deficit unsustainable (Roubini and Wachtel, 1998) and
subject to greater vulnerability (Bucevska, 2011). Following the first-generation
crisis model, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that growth rates in the money
supply and credit that exceed certain thresholds increase the likelihood of a
banking crisis. Similarly, Goldstein et al. (2000) find an appreciation of the real
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exchange rate, a decline in equity prices, a drop in exports, and a high ratio of
broad money to international reserves to be major determinants of financial crisis.
The first-generation model failed to determine the cause of the European
exchange rate mechanism crisis. In Europe, the fundamentals were quite healthy
and showed no signs of weakness, but the crisis still occurred. As a result, a new
generation of crisis model evolved.
B2. Second-generation Crisis Model
After the failure of the first-generation model, a second-generation crisis model
was proposed by Obstfeld (1986, 1996) that implies that a crisis can occur even
given strong fundamentals. The occurrence of a crisis ultimately depends on the
self-fulfilling prophecy that investors will attack the currency if they expect others
will do the same. Accordingly, doubts about whether the government is willing to
maintain its exchange rate target can lead to multiple equilibria, and a speculative
currency attack can take place and succeed even if the current policy is consistent
with the exchange rate commitment. Policies implemented to maintain a particular
exchange rate level, such as those increasing domestic interest rates, can also raise
costs by dampening economic activity or increasing bank funding costs. The main
innovation of the second-generation model consists of identifying the role that
the expectations of economic agents could play in precipitating currency crises. In
the empirical literature, Flood et al. (1996) show how to recast the KFG model to
account for interest rate pegging, whereas Chang and Velaso (2000) argue that the
government’s guarantee of shifts in expected arbitrage14 has led to financial crisis.
The second-generation crisis model failed to explain the East-Asian financial
crisis, cause by balance sheet deterioration and capital account liberalization in
the presence of a weak financial system. Finally, a third-generation crisis model
evolved to explain the nature of the financial events experienced by East Asian
economies.
B3. Third-generation Crisis Model
In the wake of the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis, the emergence of the thirdgeneration crisis model highlights how financial liberalization and government
guarantees of private sector liabilities lead to moral hazard15 and unsustainable
fiscal deficits, which become the leading factors of a financial crisis. This model
explores how rapid balance sheet deteriorations associated with fluctuations in
asset prices, including exchange rates, can trigger currency crises (Radelet and
Sachs, 1998). McKinnon and Pill (1996) argue that capital flows in the financial
liberalization of an unregulated banking sector can cause a financial crisis. When
a country opens its capital account, it becomes an important receiver of foreign
capital in the initial period. If the domestic financial system is not healthy enough to
14

15

Arbitrage is the process of buying and selling the same product in different markets to reap the benefits from
the price differential.
Moral hazard is a phenomenon wherein borrowers engage in risky behavior, knowing that someone
else will pay for their mistakes.
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absorb it, this will create a problem such as overborrowing syndrome16 (McKinnon
and Pill, 1996). The details of the explanatory variables for all three generations of
crisis models are reported in Table 2.
Table 2.
Explanatory Variables of Financial Crises
This table presents details of studies on the explanatory variables of financial crises, identified by different crisis
generation models and supporters of crisis generation models.

Crisis-generation model

Supporters

First-generation crisis model

Krugman (1979)
Blanco and Garber (1986)
Roubini and Watchtel (1998)

Second-generation crisis model

Obstfeld (1986)
Obstfeld (1996)

Third-generation crisis model

Flood et al. (1996)
Chang and Velaso (2000)
McKinnon and Pill (1996)
Radelet and Sachs (1998)

Explanatory variables
Fixed exchange rate
Fiscal deficit
Inflation
Trade deficit
Declining foreign reserves
Growth rate of money
Credit to reserve ratio
Including the explanatory
variables of the first-generation
model,
Govt. guarantees for arbitrage
expectation shift
Interest rate pegging
Including explanatory variables
of the above two models,
Capital account liberalization
Growth in M2 multiplier
Growth in credit/GDP
Ratio of domestic bank loan to
GDP
Liabilities/GDP ratio
Fall in bank deposits/GDP ratio
Contagion dummy
Short-term capital flows/GDP

In the presence of a variety of explanatory variables in line with the crisis generation
models, EWMs are set to provide the predictive indicators of a financial crisis,
using various statistical/econometric methodologies.

16

The premature opening of a capital account will lead to a sudden increase in capital inflow. The premature
opening of a capital account in a weak financial system of low institutional quality can lead to the outflow of
foreign capital as well as domestic capital. This situation is called the overborrowing syndrome (McKinnon
and Pill, 1996).
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C. Statistical/ Econometric Methodologies
The third stage of EWMs consists of statistical/econometric analyses for a given
crisis definition and set of explanatory variables. Three conventional empirical
approaches are associated with EWMs: the indicator approach (Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999) and/or signaling approach (Kaminsky et al., 1998) and the limited
dependent variable probit/logit model (Eichengreen et al.,1995; Frankel and Rose,
1996). Other categories of approaches include the use of innovative techniques for
the identification and explanation of financial crisis, such as Markov switching
models (Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Martinez, 2002; Abiad, 2003), artificial neural
networks (ANNs) and genetic algorithms (Nag and Mitra, 1999; Apoteker and
Barthelemy, 2000), binary recursive trees (Ghosh and Ghosh, 2003; Frankel and
Wei, 2005), and unit root testing (Virtanen et al., 2016).
C1. Indicator and Signal Approaches
The first category of approaches is nonparametric and includes the indicator
approach and/or signal approach, introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and
augmented by Bruggermann and Linne (1999) and Edison (2003). Given a number
of leading indicators of a crisis, these approaches determine the threshold level
beyond which an event is classified as a crisis. The approaches face serious
difficulties, because it is not possible to determine the significance of the indicators
directly, since thresholds are determined in sample. Determination of the optimal
threshold level involves striking a balance between failing to predict a crisis that
actually occurs (type I error) and predicting a crisis that does not actually occur
(type II error). Accordingly, if the threshold is set too low, then the indicators will
catch all the crises but will produce many false signals (noise). Conversely, if the
threshold is too high, the indicator will never issue a false alarm, but it will miss all
the crises. Hence, for each variable, the optimal threshold is selected to optimize
the signal-to-noise ratio. Another solution is to rank the usefulness of the indicators
in declining order of their signal-to-noise ratios (more details are reported in Table
3). Further, the out-of-sample performance17 of the signal approach has been tested
by Berg and Patillo (1999a, 1999b), Bussiere and Mudler (2000), and Berg et al.
(2005), who find it provides a moderate level of prediction of financial crises.
Although the signaling approach occupies a prominent place in warning
about a signal, we still drop it because of a few shortcomings. First, when each
variable is evaluated separately, it neglects interrelated sets of conditions. Second,
it ignores potential correlations between different indicators. Third, this approach
issues only binary signals, which are either that an indicator is above its threshold,
denoting a signal, or below its threshold, denoting no signal of a potential crisis.
Consequently, there is no measure of the strength of the signal that is potentially
related to the extent to which it exceeds its threshold.

17

Out-of-sample forecast performance is used to evaluate the forecasting performance of a statistical test and
is generally considered more trustworthy than evidence based on in-sample performance, since in-sample
performance can be sensitive to outliers and data mining.

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss4/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v22i4

12

Padhan and Prabheesh: EFFECTIVENESS OF EARLY WARNING MODELS: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND NEW
Effectiveness of Early Warning Models: A Critical Review and New Agenda for Future Directions

469

Table 3.
Signal-to-noise Ratio Matrix
The table reports the noise-to-signal ratio matrix associated with the signal approach (Kaminsky et al., 1999). The
cell named A indicates that a signal is considered accurate if a variable signal and a crisis occur in the following 24
months. On the other hand, the cell named B is said to be a false alarm if a variable signal and no crisis occurs in that
time frame. Hence, a perfect indicator would only have entries in cells named A and D. In general, the noise-to-signal
ratio for any indicator is traced by the number of entries:
[B (B+D)] / [A (A+C)]
It is the ratio of false signals to all possible bad signals divided by the ratio of good signals to all possible good signals.
The extreme noisy indicator would have few entries in cells named A and D, and more in cells named B and C.

Description
Indicator issues a signal
The indicator does not issue a signal

A crisis occurs in the
following 24 months

No crisis occurs in the
following 24 months

A
C

B
D

C2. Logit and Probit Model
The second category of approaches, that is, linear regression or limited dependent
variable estimation methods such as probit and logit techniques, are the most
popular category in the literature. Eichengreen et al. (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996),
and Sach et al. (1996) are among the first studies to have used these techniques to
test the statistical significance of various indicators in determining the probability
of a future financial crisis. Eichengreen et al. (1996) adopts a probit model to predict
currency crises and finds that speculative attacks on a fixed exchange rate play a
significant role in predicting the incidence of a currency crisis. Further, DemirgucKunt and Detragiache (1998) analyze factors associated with the emergence
of systemic banking crises and find banking distress to be associated with low
economic growth, high inflation, and high interest rates. Similarly, Joyce (2011),
Frost and Tilburg (2014), Hamdi and Jlassi (2014), and Kulkarni and Kamaiah
(2015) have used this method extensively to predict financial crises. Additionally,
Berg and Pattillo (1999b) highlight the advantages of probability models to
overcome the difficulties of a signal approach. First, they provide a framework
for the separately testing of the statistical significance of individual explanatory
variables. Second, they consider the correlation between the regressors and
combine informative indicators into a single composite indicator of crisis. Third,
their model allows for the estimation of the probability of a crisis. Fourth, it allows
for the introduction of various functional forms between the binominal dependent
variable and explanatory variables.
Although logit/probit models have been extensively used, they are still subject
to shortcomings. First, the definition of financial crisis as a dummy variable leads
to an ad hoc assumption when constructing the model. Second, this approach is
subject to the loss of information. Third, single-step estimation can also lead to
biased results.
C3. Markov Switching Approach
The Markov switching approach was pioneered by Jeanne and Masson (2000) and
used by Cerra and Saxena (2002) to model contagion in the context of Indonesia
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in 1997. Mariano et al. (2000) and Abiad (2002, 2003) were the first to use this
approach in EWMs and introduced it as an alternative approach for predicting a
currency crisis.
The Markov switching approach of Abiad (2003) applies time-varying
probabilities in modeling a speculative attack, which allows the model to utilize
information involved in exchange rate dynamics. Abiad highlights the advantages
of this approach over previous ones, such as its avoidance of the many ad hoc
assumptions required by previous models, as well as the loss of information
caused by the transformation of variables into binary crisis dummy variables in
the logit/probit model. First, Abiad’s Markov switching approach can be derived
directly from the second-generation crisis model. Second, the approach includes an
endogenous crisis determination period rather than the dummy assigned by other
models. Third, easily forecast and multistep crisis events can be calculated. Fourth,
the inclusion of latent variables captures the exchange rate dynamics. Fifth, the
approach determines the longevity of probable crisis period and does not require
exclusion windows. Finally, the approach focuses on a set of reliable observable
variables, multi-period forecasting horizons, and an empirical framework for
analyzing the contagion effect of the crisis to improve short-term forecasts. The
model’s major weakness is its difficulty of creation. A powerful program is needed
to run the algorithms, since they are not part of any econometric package. Further,
this approach is highly computational, with difficulties in the case of no switching
and failing to cooperate with more explanatory variables.
C4. Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms
The ANN approach is capable of learning through a process of trial and error that
can be approximated as a statistical estimation of model parameters. The use of
neural network analysis in the context of EWMs is due to Nag and Mitra (1999),
who constructed an early warning system for currency crises and compare its
performance to the indicator approach using monthly data for Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand in 1980–1998. Similarly, Frank and Schmied (2004) suggest predicting
speculative attacks by using the ANN approach and test the predictability of crises
in Russia and Brazil. In addition, Apoteker and Barthelemy (2000) use a genetic
algorithm to fend against sudden changes in economic indicators to improve the
predictive capacity of the risk ratings of risk monitoring services in emerging
economies.
The primary advantages associated with ANNs are their flexible specification
and ability to capture complex interactions among variables. Nonetheless,
disadvantages of the ANN approach include greater danger of overfitting,
compared to other methodologies, the lack of coefficient estimation, and
complicated interactions between the variables. Finally, it is difficult to identify
potential indicators that are abnormal or the drivers of forecasting probabilities.
C5. Binary Recursive Trees and Unit Root Tests
Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) use a binary recursive tree to examine the role of
structural factors, corporate financing structure, and macroeconomic variables in
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causing a currency crisis for 40 industrialized and emerging countries from 1987
to 1999. The authors find that structural vulnerabilities played an important role
in leading to a deep currency crisis and there were complex interactions between
these structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances. Although a binary
recursive tree allows for interactions between the various explanatory variables,
accounting for structural factors that do not change much, it will be difficult for it
to generate a warning and it will thus have limited application in the real world.
A binary recursive tree is similar to an ANN, in that it requires computational
programming to identify the interlinkages between the structural vulnerability
and macroeconomic variables.
In a different approach, Virtanen et al. (2016) use unit root–based EWMs for the
ex ante prediction of financial crises for 15 European Union countries, combining
early warning signals from multiple time series into a composite indicator. They
find that unit root–based methods are successful at predicting financial crises, in
both in-sample and out-of-sample estimations. Since the unit root tests of EWMs
are computed using a set of parametric values such as window lags and numbers
of lags, they are subject to determinative choices of these values and specification
uncertainty.
In the presence of a variety of statistical/econometric methodologies of EWMs,
it is difficult for academicians and policymakers to choose a suitable method for the
empirical exercise. However, the choice of empirical method in handling EWMs
depends only upon the researcher’s perspective. The details of the statistical and
empirical methodologies of EWMs are presented in Table 4.
Table 4.
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM
The table reports the various empirical methodologies used for the third stage of the early warning models. The table
covers the details about model types, authors, methodology, and limitations of the various methodologies used for
the construction of early warning models. The * denotes the founder of the empirical methodologies.

Type
Indicator and Signal
Approach

Authors
Kaminsky-LinzondoReinhart (1998)*

Methodology
Threshold level of an
indicator.

-     It’s a warning, no
signal about crisis
appearance.

Bruggermann and
Linne (1999)
Edison (2003)
Eichengreen et al.
(1995)*
Logit and Probit Model

Limitations
-    Neglect
interrelations.

Dummy for financial
crisis.

-    Ad-hoc assumption
Frankel and Rose (1996) Statistical testing and
statistical significance of -    Loss of information
Sach et al. (1996)
individual variables.
-    Single step
Eichengreen et al. (1996)
estimation
Estimation of
Demirguc-Kunt and
probability of occurring
Detragiache (1998)
a financial crisis.
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Table 4.
Statistical/Econometric Methodologies of EWM (Continued)
Type
Markov-Switching
Approach

Authors
Mariano et al. (2000)*
Abiad (2002)

Methodology

Cerra and Saxena (2002) Multi-stage estimation.
Endogenous
Abiad (2003)
determination of crisis
period.
Inclusion of latent
variable.

Artificial Neural Network Nag and Mitra (1999)*
(ANN) and Genetic
Apoteker and
Algorithms
Barthelemy (2000)

Neural network
predictability.
Genetic algorithms.

Frank and Schmied
(2004)

Binary Recursive Tree

Ghosh and Ghosh
(2003)*

Unit-Root Test Based

Virtanen et al. (2016)*

Limitations

Allows for time-varying -    Difficulty in model
creation.
probabilities.
-    Highly computation
and need strong
programing
language.
-     Not a part of
econometric
packages.
-    Fails to cooperate
more explanatory
variable.
-     Danger of
overfitting.
-    No coefficient
estimation.
-     Difficulty in
identifying
indicators.
-     Complicated
interaction.
Decision-theoretic
-    Difficulty in
classification technique.
generating
warnings.
Convert multiple time -    Exposed to
series into composite
deterministic choice.
indicators.
-    Specification
Window lags

uncertainty.

EWMs evolved over time, given various definitions, explanatory variables, and
statistical/econometric methodologies. Starting with the definition of empirical
methodologies, EWMs needed to be augmented. The failure of the first-generation
crisis model to explain the European exchange rate mechanism crisis resulted
in the second-generation model, and the failure of the second-generation model
to explain the East Asian financial crisis resulted in the evolution of the thirdgeneration crisis model. Such evolution has not only improved the predictive
power of EWMs, but also supported the further need for EWMs, even after an
event. The failure of EWMs to predict national or regional financial events has
been questioned before as well. Therefore, different crisis generation models
have evolved to further improve their predictive power. In the context of GFC,
the complex nature of the occurrence and quick transmission of shocks has led
to the failure of EWMs worldwide. Finally, this is not the time to question the
general effectiveness of EWMs; rather, the effectiveness of existing models should
be improved by eradicating the lacunae associated with them. In this paper, we
provide a research agenda to enhance the effectiveness of existing EWMs.
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III. SEEDS FOR THE BIRTH OF A NEW AGENDA
A1. Motivation from the Failure of Identification
EWMs to analyze and predict leading indicators or the accurate timing of the
occurrence of a crises are essential for policy formulation. The failure of EWMs
to identify the GFC (Davis and Karim, 2008; Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2010, 2012;
Christofides et al., 2016) has raised questions about their efficiency within their
operational framework. However, the solution is not to abandon the existing
EWMs, but, rather, to eradicate the weaknesses associated with them, enhancing
their efficiency. Further, the accuracy of early models cannot be underestimated,
since they accurately predicted the occurrence of a financial crisis in the case
of the Chilean crisis in 1982, Brazil in 1994, the Korean crisis in 1997–1998, the
Argentinean crisis in 2001, and the Turkish case in 2001.
Stagewise specifications in the EWMs should be carried out with caution, since
the stage’s accuracy will determine the final accuracy. Given the dynamic nature of
financial crises, it is harder to define a financial crisis and identify the explanatory
variables in comparison to choosing a method of statistical/econometric analysis
to associate with the models. A more accurate specification of the operating
framework of EWMs in the first two stages will lead to accuracy depending on
the choice of statistical/econometric methodologies. The failure of EWMs to at
least notice the GFC (Rose and Spiegel, 2009, 2012) clearly indicates their failure at
every stage of the operating framework. Finally, to augment the existing EWMs,
we need to augment all the stages according to the dynamic nature of the financial
crisis.
A2. Dynamic Nature of Crisis Models
The evolution from past crises, indicating changes in the leading factors causing
the financial crisis over various periods (Eichengreen, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009a). Thus, the formation of policy to control financial crises based on the
leading indicators of an earlier form of financial crisis might not result in efficient
policy actions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Further, the efficiency of policy tools in
controlling financial crises depends entirely on how accurately the financial crisis
is defined and the nature of the occurrence identified.
The next question that arises is whether the current measurement of
the financial crisis is efficient in its identification procedure or whether any
augmentation is needed to enhance the performance of such measurements. The
financial crisis in the late 1970s in the Latin American countries emphasizes the role
of weak macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas the case of European countries
in the 1980s emphasizes multiple equilibria and the self-fulfilling prophecies of
investors as the leading indicators (Eichengreen, 2003). The mismanagement of
capital flows, moral hazard, and private sector liabilities caused the East Asian
financial crisis in 1997–1998 (Radelet and Sachs, 2000). On the other hand, the GFC,
was caused by subprime mortgage lending and housing bubbles. In this context,
Rose and Spiegel (2009) identified three causes of the predictive failure of EWMs.
First, the different causes of the 2008 crisis across countries could be the leading
factor of the financial crisis, and, second, the GFC could be the result of a global
shock, rather than unregulated country-specific financial and macroeconomic
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fundamentals. Finally, the shock originated in the United States but transmitted
across its borders.
The changing nature of financial crises must be considered to accurately
identify upcoming financial crises. In this regard, the crisis generation models
should be dynamic to capture the dynamic nature of crises. Additionally, there is
no need to justify why crisis generation models should evolve over time.
A3. The Subprime Lending Crisis: A Burning Example of this Time Being Different
In the context of the subprime lending/mortgage crisis in 2007–2008, Shiller (2005)
notes the inability of long-term domestic economic factors to explain the rise in
housing prices since 1998, where the Case–Shiller Home Price Index18 rose to 67%
from 1998-2006, in comparison to a normal increase from 1890 to 1998, but with
no such change in the real GDP, population, long-term interest rate, and so forth.
This rise in housing prices looks unsustainable and ultimately turns into a global
financial crisis. Shiller emphasizes the role of psychological bias and social processes
such as overoptimism, overconfidence, contagion, and herd behavior in framing
the irrational exuberance19 that led to the crisis in the presence of media stories of
a new era, where market participants and policymakers believed in an indefinite
rise in housing prices in the future. Similarly, Connor et al. (2010) identifies
irrational exuberance and related asset price bubbles as a crucial factor responsible
for the banking crises in the United States and Ireland. On the other hand, Rajan
(2010), in his book Fault Lines, explains that the low- and middle-income groups
reduced their savings and increased their debt since income inequality started
shooting up in the United States. This led to not only a temporary increment in
private consumption and employment but also the creation of a credit bubble. The
downturn in the housing market led to the seed of the subprime mortgage crisis in
2007, and the rest was fostered by the expansion of debt-financed private demand,
turning this event into the global recession of 2008. Further, Rajan (2005) blames
misguided government policies in promoting credit expansion to households in
the absence of adequate collateral.
This supply-side argument of the so-called Rajan (2010) hypothesis and
the psychological-social arguments of Shiller (2005) in the context of irrational
exuberance explain more asset bubbles in the United States. This irrational
exuberance has increased the need for homes that consumers perceive as being
costly in the future, whereas the credit expansion by the government through
overindebtedness has led to the easy availability of money, which has led to further
raising housing prices. At the same time, different financial innovations such as
shadow banking,20 securitization, and the entry of new financial intermediaries
have increased the likelihood of turmoil induced by the finance sector.
18

19

20

The Case–Shiller Home Price Index is the index of housing prices in the United States. Its construction
is due to Karl Case and Robert Shiller, who measured the housing pricing boom in Boston and tried
to describe similar trends across the United States.
Irrational exuberance describes the situation in which investors’ enthusiasm becomes the reason for
raising asset prices that are not supported by fundamentals. See Shiller (2005) for more details.
A shadow banking system is the term used for the system of a group of non-bank financial
intermediaries that facilitates services similar to those of a banking system, but without being subject
to banking regulation.
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Allen and Moessner (2011) argue that the GFC was transmitted to various
countries through three channels: the shadow banking system, collateral squeeze21,
and carry trade unwinding.22 The GFC differs from the global recession of 1929–
1931 because the liquidity commitment of commercial banks was a serious problem
during the GFC, whereas the global recession in 1929 witnessed a restriction in
channeling the liquidity created by the gold standard period. The GFC was a fiery
example of this time being different, weakening the crisis generation models’
identification of the leading factors for the financial crisis. The GFC was a repetition
of this syndrome (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) and proof of why an early warning
system should be dynamic (Candelon et al., 2014). This situation not demonstrates
the dynamic occurrence of a financial event, but also highlights the need for a
new generation of models that can capture the dynamic nature of financial crises
(Goldstein and Razin, 2013).
IV. RESEARCH AGENDA AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We now suggest a future research agenda, on the following grounds.
A1. The Need for a Hybrid Measure of Financial Crisis
The various typologies of financial crisis have themselves created a puzzle in the
way to define what a financial crisis is all about. A currency crisis is defined as
a depreciation of currency of 25% or a depreciation of 15% with 10% inflation,
whereas a banking crisis is identified by bank runs and liquidity crash. A sovereign
debt crisis is all about the repayment of debt and defaults, whereas sudden stops
involve the halt of capital flows, specifically in relation to emerging countries that
finance their current account deficit using foreign capital. Differently, a balance
of payment crisis is likely to occur in conjunction with a currency crisis and not
considered to be a single type of financial crisis. The joint occurrence of a currency
crisis and a banking crisis, that is, a twin crisis, will make a country’s economic
situation worse than in a single-crisis case. Finally, the global recession of 2008 has
its own significance in making financial crises costlier in the form of a triple crisis.
The accuracy of measuring financial crisis is a challenging task in the presence
of various financial crisis typologies. The choice of financial crisis measurement
is not difficult in the case of a single financial crisis event (Claessens and Kose,
2013). Conversely, the joint occurrence of financial crises, as in twin and triple
crises, is difficult to measure when constructing EWMs, since the mixture of
21

22

A collateral squeeze is a process aimed at reducing counterparty risk where, if the borrower defaults,
the collateral will be seized and paid to the creditor. It is part of the regulation of financial systems,
where the loans must meet criteria for eligibility, that is, the level of collateral is decided based on
property valuation.
For example, since US and European interest rates are low, Japanese investors started to sell their
dollar and euro investments and return their money to Japan. Yen carry trade becomes unprofitable,
and investors can lose substantial amounts if the yen rises against the dollar or euro. Consequently,
with a rising yen, people sell their foreign investments and end their carry trades. This increases
demand for the yen even more, causing a further rise in the yen. This is the scenario of carry trade
unwinding.
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quantitative and qualitative measurements of financial crisis might not be accurate
and can lead to the model’s failure (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In this context,
with the presence of quantitative and qualitative measures of financial crisis,
the construction of hybrid measures based on a certain weighting will be more
productive in forecasting the future occurrence of twin or triple crises or the
probability of leading to another form of financial crisis.
A2. Identifying Potential Explanatory Variables for the Financial Crisis: The Need for a
Fourth-generation Crisis Model
The failure to identify the leading factors of crisis emphasizes the need for a
fourth-generation crisis model to explain the leading factors of a new financial
crisis (Goldstein and Razin, 2013). Identification of the dynamic nature of financial
crises and inclusion of the leading factors become a difficult task, since none of
the three crisis generation models are able to explain the leading factors that
caused the GFC (Candelon et al., 2012, 2014). The GFC was a distinct event in
the history of financial crises, not only in terms of depth and duration but also
in terms of its leading factors. Economic factors alone were not able to explain
the hike in housing prices after 1998, and psychosocial factors fostered soaring
inequality (Shiller, 2005), which finally turned into the global financial crisis
(Imbs, 2010). This event was triggered by misguided government policies and an
unregulated financial system (Rajan, 2005, 2010). The crisis was difficult to foresee
because of the distinct nature of its occurrence, which certainly requires additional
narrative in terms of factors causing the financial crisis and identification of the
links between psychosocial factors and macroeconomic crises. The various links
between real estate prices, credit expansion through government policies, and
consumer expectation–tracking theories of consumption require a clear theoretical
framework to explain the occurrence of the housing bubble. Thus, capturing the
dynamic nature of the financial crisis requires the fourth-generation crisis model
to accurately identify the financial crisis, a challenging task for both academicians
and policymakers. Specifically, the crisis generation models are related to the
currency crisis; however, the explanatory variables follow a similar pattern in
explaining various other forms of crisis. Further, the occurrence of twin and triple
crises affirms that a particular explanatory variable can have predictive power for
various financial crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). We therefore suggest the
need for a fourth-generation crisis model.
A3. Contagion/interconnectedness as an Explanatory Variable
The word contagion generally denotes the spread of market disturbances from one
country to another and is a process observed through comovements in exchange
rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows, and so forth. The GFC has
amplified the importance of contagion, originating from the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and spreading to most countries (Imbs, 2010). In line with the failure of
EWMs to foresee the financial crisis of 2007–2008, financial contagion has its own
significance in predicting the financial crisis. Furthermore, Babecky et al. (2011,
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2012) emphasize the increasing role of global factors and interconnectedness
among markets as leading risk factors in today’s integrated world.
Examples of the channel of transmission of shocks include the role of insurance
(Allen and Gale, 1998), the wake-up call hypothesis (Goldstein, 1998), the role of
common creditors (Pritsker, 2013), and bank run psychology (Summers, 2000).
Kaminsky et al. (2003) also note the role of information cascades,23 causing global
spillover. Thus, identifying the nature of spillover is essential in the appropriate
design of both crisis mitigation and crisis management responses (Claessens and
Kose, 2013).
The role of contagion in transmitting financial crises while increasing trade
and financial integration has been identified in the literature in various ways.
Eichengreen et al. (1996) find that the contagion effect remains significant, whereas
Fratzscher (1998) supports the contagious nature of the currency crisis with
a comparison of the Latin American crisis with the East Asian crisis. Similarly,
Cerra and Saxena (2002) and Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) confirm the significant
role of contagion in transmitting shocks. Similarly, Hermansen and Rohn (2015)
emphasize the role of global risk indicators outperforming domestic indicators in
terms of highlighting the role of international development. Finally, the spread of
the crisis to other countries indicates that financial integration plays an important
role in transmitting financial crises, since one country’s vulnerable financial
market can have an impact on other countries through their interlinkages in
either macroeconomic transmission or the shock transmission channel (Bordo and
Helbling, 2003). Additionally, Minoiu et al. (2015) examine the connectedness of
financial linkages in predicting banking crises. Connectedness plays an important
role in the transmission of crisis, because the failure of one economic agent leads to
direct failure (insolvency) and indirect failure (cross-border panic) as well. In line
with Peltonen et al. (2015), we argue that the inclusion of quantitative contagion
indexes can enhance the efficiency of existing EWMs. Although the role of financial
contagion has been highlighted in the literature, there is still ample room to fill
the gap associated with the weaknesses of existing EWMs. Thus, the inclusion of
contagion indicators can fill the lacuna of existing EWMs and proves to be a crucial
tool in enhancing the efficiency of EWMs, instead of a dummy index of contagion
subject to post-crisis bias (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006).
Table 5 provides the five definitions and measurements highlighted by Pericoli
and Sbracia (2003). The EWMs’ inclusion of these quantitative contagion indicators
could enhance their efficiency.
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Table 5.
Definition and Measurements of Contagion
The table covers the five definitions and measurements of contagion as highlighted by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).

No.

Definition

Measurement

1

When a significant increase in the probability
of a crisis in one country, conditional on a crisis
occurring in another country.

Exchange rate pressure index

2

When the volatility of asset prices spillover from
the crisis country to other countries.

Multivariate GARCH model

3

When cross-country co-movements of asset prices
cannot be explained by fundamentals.

Jumps in multiple equilibria

4

When a significant increase in co-movements of
prices and quantities across markets, conditional
on a crisis occurring in one market or group
markets.

Markov-Switching approach Correlation

5

When the transmission channel intensifies or,
more generally, changes after a shock in one
market.

Data generating process

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new agenda for augmenting existing EWMs that could
capture the dynamic nature of financial crises. We propose an agenda based on
three aspects: measurement of a hybrid index of the financial crisis, the need for
a fourth-generation crisis model, and the role of contagion/interconnectedness in
the model. This agenda could be helpful in the construction of EWMs to predict
the occurrence of a financial event. Finally, there is an essential need to augment
EWMs to fend off a financial crisis.
This paper’s proposed agenda for the construction of EWMs certainly does
not constitute final steps toward a comprehensive EWM of financial crises.
Rather, it suggests the construction of an EWM by eradicating the various lacunae
associated with the existing models that can outline the difficulties. By suggesting
a new agenda for the construction of EWMs to resolve these difficulties, this paper
proposes various steps toward augmenting the existing EWMs, which could
become more powerful tools in predicting financial crises. Future research could
focus on the construction and empirical examination of this new agenda.
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